t i n g viewp o i n t s w i t h o f t e n r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t points o f departure. In the v a rious treatises a d d r e s s i n g this f u n d a mental contrast, the w r i t i n g s of J o h n S t u a r t Mi l l h a v e b e e n w i d e l y d e p i c t e d as the c l a s s i c e x p r e s s i o n o f 19 t h cen t u r y l i b e r a l i s t thought (in w h i c h era the f o u n d a t i o n of l i b e r a l i s m m a y b e said to reside). Nevertheless, the fact that Mi l l c a l l e d h i m s e l f a s o c i a l i s t in his later years, t hough not a w e l l -k n o w n or u n i v e r s a l l y a c c e p t e d one, could sug g e s t e i t h e r a b a s i c i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y in the e v o l u t i o n of his p h i l o s o p h y or per h a p s a f o r u m for the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of p u t a t i v e l y inimi c a l ideologies. This study w i l l expl o r e this " i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y " and, t h r o u g h an analysis of the concept of i n dividualism, w i l l atte m p t to c l a r i f y the r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h the s e e m i n g l y di s p a r a t e traditions of l i b e r a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m h o l d w i t h r e g a r d to Mill. The f o l l o w i n g p e r t i n e n t themes m a y b e n o t e d as b a c k g r o u n d to the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n .Î n his e a r l i e r w r i t i n g Mill p o s i t i o n e d h i m s e l f p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y a m o n g the c l assical liberals. His p o r t r a y a l of the m u l t i -f a c e t e d r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the indiv i d u a l and society testifies to his u n c r i t i c a l a c c e p t a n c e of c e r t a i n classical l i b e r a l i s t themes w h i c h b e c o m e g r a d u a l l y r e f o r m u l a t e d in his l a ter y e ars as features of his d e m o c r a t i c liberalism.
This newer liberalism has been viewed as an attempt to render intelligible changing social conditions and to provide some direction through them. Thus, its principles might be applied to contradictory or conflicting interests, like those of labor and capital, with the result being an attempt to reconcile the claims of each on some elevated, or more abstract, plane of analysis. But this approach has encountered difficulties; foremost among them, for present purposes, is how to interpret Mill's avowed socialist affiliation consequent to his libertarian pursuit of truths
e m b o d i e d in c o n f l i c t i n g claims, notably, those of the p r o p e r t i e d and of the l a b o r i n g classes. A n o t h e r obvi o u s d i f f i c u l t y in this a p p r o a c h is h o w to r e c o n c i l e M i l l 's " s o c i a l i s m " w i t h his p e r s i s t e n t individualism.

A n i n t e r e s t i n g arr a y of o pinions h a v e b e e n e x p r e s s e d in the l i t e r a t u r e w i t h r e s p e c t to M i ll's s o -c a l l e d s o c i a l i s t p e rspective. The s e m a y b e c a t e g o r i z e d in the f o l lowing t r i p a r t i t e way; those that h o l d that (a) M i ll's i n d i v i d u a l i s m and his s o c i a l i s m are compatible. For instance, B riggs^ and W i n c h c l a i m M i l l g r a d u a l l y m o v e d towards socialism, that he s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s t r e s s e d the n e e d for "individuality", and t hought it c r e d i b l e that the former m a y p r o v i d e the la t t e r w i t h a p r o p e r co n t e x t of g r o w t h ^ (Briggs) or that Mill's a t t e m p t e d synthesis commands respect^( W i n c h ) : or, c o n c u r r e n c e w i t h s o c i alists o n some issues, perhaps b y dec i d i n g e a c h iss u e on its o w n merit, n e e d n o t m e a n co n v e r s i o n to s o c i a l i s m (Albee);^ (b) M i ll's i n d i v i d u a l i s m and his s o c i a l i s m are incompatible. F o r example, he tried t o^r e c o n c i l e irreconcilables"° ( B a i n ) ; or his q u a l i f i e d s o c i a l i s m r e d e f i n e d the i s o l a t e d " i n d i v i d u a l " as e s s e n t i a l l y a social being, so r e j e c t i n g a v i s i o n of s o c i e t y b a s e d u p o n the former' ( F o s d i c k ) ; and (c) M i l l ' s i n d i v i d u a l i s m m a y entail his s o c i a l i s m (by e x t e n s i o n ) . For instance, r e s e m b l i n g a n o n -r e v o l u t i o n a r y syndicalism^ (Robbins) or v o l u n t a r y w o r k e r s cooperatives, M i l l ' s s o c i a l i s m a t t e m p t e d to adapt l i b e r a l i s m to c h a n g i n g s o c i o e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s^ (Wolff); and r e g a r d i n g these conditions, the classes of c a p italists and of laborers " s h o u l d be e q u a l l y b a l a n c e d so n e i t h e r can d ominate the o t h e r " l O ( S h i e l d s ) .
A u t o b i o g r a p h y of J o h n S t u a r t M i l l , A s a Briggs, Ed. (New YorEl
The N e w A m e r i c a n Library, 1964), p p . 167-168.
Briggs, " F o r e w a r d , " A u t o b i o g r a p h y ««.. Mill: P r i n c i p l e s o f P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y , D o n a l d Winch, Ed. ( M a r y l a n d : P e n g u i n Books, 1970). E rnest Albee, A H i s t o r y of E n g l i s h U t i l i t a r i a n i s m (New York:
Co l l i e r Bookers, 1962). A l e x a n d e r Bain, J.S. Mill: A c r i t i c i s m (London: L o n g m a n 's , G r e e n , and Company, 1882). 
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Another writer^-! (Barker) claims that Mill's theory of individualism was too abstract, and his theory of liberty, empty, and so therefore, Mill could allow that "voluntary" associations like trade unions offer great scope for (individual) liberty. Though this claim leaves untouched the question of the connection between individ ualism and socialism, it does permit us to see a serious shortcoming in a sociopolitical philosophy so abstract that it offers no rules for application to concrete affairs.
In contrast with the above views, the present study claims that Mill never abandoned his liberalist philosophy. Indeed, his "socialism" might best be interpreted in rather a different light than Mill intended: as enmeshed within the conceptual framework of democratic liberalism. Accord ingly this study provides a general definition of the features of socialism--one that is broad enough in scope to encompass the somewhat diverse theories of that rubric--and in terms of which Mill's "socialism" will be systematically evaluated. This study will demonstrate that Mill's view of socialism did not conform to the characteristic elements of that philosophy, except in the most tangential way.
Mill's Classical Liberalism
In tracing the evolution of Mill's philosophy from its beginnings in utilitarian theory, other scholars have observed*^ that notable landmarks in his intellectual development coincided with certain crises in his life. Considering the extremely young age at which Mill began his education, by his mid-teenage years, he was a serious scholar, publishing articles in the Westminster Review (his father's Liberalist journal) and holding a minor post with East India House.13 His philosophical contributions during those years were representative of classical liberal philosophy--the tradition in which he was meticulously educated by his father, James Mill, an arch-disciple of utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham. John Mill's philosophy evolved through several stages from classical iaissez-faire liberalism to democratic liberalism, as evidenced in his reformulated individualism and his combination and modifica tion of utilitarianism and natural law. 
H-Sir Ernest
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Mill's early concept of the individual, shared by certain Enlightenment and early 19th century philosophers,!4 placed the formation of human nature prior to human involvement in society. This putative pre-social nature of the individual was seen to originate and operate in accord with appropriate general laws for understanding social relations and forces. In "Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy," Mill distinguished three levels of analysis on which the concept of the individual could be addressed. The most rudimentary level represented the individual's essential nature, viewed as distinct from societal contact. The second level, that of interpersonal interaction addressed the activities of individuals in contact with each other as individuals. On the third level, the nature of the individual was regarded as conditioned by his membership in a larger society.15 This "larger society" was merely an abstract term applied to individuals in a sort of inseparable association.!® Together, but from different perspectives, natural law and utilitarianism portrayed the natural condition of the individual in society as characterized by a fundamental antagonism. Natural law theorists in Mill's day viewed the individual as morally autonomous creatures of nature who, in social organization, were protected by a system of natural rights. All social institutions gained legitimacy to the extent that they respected the beneficent natural order.
Premised upon an ethic of self-interest, the Benthamite ideal of utilitarianism, to which young Mill subscribed, postulated that "individuals seek their own happiness (pleasure or the removal of obstacles thereto) and seek to avoid pain."!' The utility principle represented the idea that certain institutions of society may be more conducive than others to greater happiness, either qualitatively or quantitatively, and, thus, should be promoted. In his early years, Mill followed closely in this tradition believing that natural laws govern both individual behavior and social relations. He believed that the ideal state would be one which possessed no interests of its own save those of its individual members taken in the aggregate.1° Mill here cautioned against assuming that man's essential nature became somehow transformed into another kind of substance when living in a society. In the ideal state, the happiness of a single individual and that of the greatest aggregate of individuals would be naturally consistent. However, Mill viewed the institution of government in existing sociopolitical arrangements as essentially antagonistic to the interests of the individual. While at some point in his later years he would advocate representative government as the only form of government able to insure the greatest happiness for the greatest number, his earliest philosophy led him tc the brink of anarchism--to a "philosophical radicalism" calling for widespread societal reform on certain social issues such as population control (if not on universal suffrage).
During his early twenties, Mill suffered a profound crisis in his life™ which caused him to question the values and orientations of his utilitarian radicalism. That his "coming of age" could produce near suicidal effects can be explained by the rigors of his early academic training which denied to him a balanced emotional life. Thus, the very "happiness principle" that he sought as a utilitarian philosopher was unattainable in his personal life. Mill sought solace in art and poetry--forms of expression disdained in classical utilitarian theory as vehicles not of truth but of pleasure. Mill's partiality to poetry signaled his eventual departure from the Benthamite traditions^l which held that truth can be its own appropriate means of satisfying them.23 Later, in The Subjection of Women, he re-emphasized that social institutions correspond not to the features of human nature but, more likely, to the historical conditions of a given age.24 Mill advanced his theory of democratic liberalism as the appropriate philosophy for the transitional age through which he was living. Nevertheless, democratic liberalism maintained the same general focus as did its precursor; both phases of liberalism reflected the ideology of capitalism by supporting the utility of the private property system as contributory to the general social well being. However, in other respects, democratic liberalism was clearly a departure from classical liberalism in its reformulation of utility theory and in its re-evaluation of natural law with respect to democracy.
Democratic ideals and principles were not always a part of the liberalist philosophy. Mill's view of democracy interpreted the concept of "right" as an essential contributor to human happiness in society by granting to all people a natural entitlement to equal moral consideration. Mill advocated for all individuals "complete equality on all legal, political, social and domestic relationsf25 as conditional for personal improvement and happiness. At first he placed more control in the hands of individuals over some of the institutions and affairs affecting them and thus over the grounds of their moral and social betterment. Later, in Considerations on Representative Government he expressed the idea that the state should intervene toJ promote the commonwealth because he felt that public well being could only be assured in the long run by a representa tive government.26 in this view, government would serve and be justified by the individuals to whom it would belong. While he worried that moral and spiritual decay might befall the individual by merging into group identity, he envisioned that growth could be accomplished in this manner without revolution. 
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Mill had always found it necessary throughout his writings to link the progressive development of liberalism to the theory of individualism. For it was the greater happiness of this "individual" as the basic presocial unit of analysis that would provide the ultimate moral justification for any type of social action. Mill's essay On Liberty may be regarded as transitional between his two related tnough distinct theories of individualism: the "atomic" (classical) and the "social" phases. In the classicial manner, he believed certain provinces of human existence to be naturally invi o l a b l e ; 28 he acknowledged that the free development of individuality was not only one of the main requirements of well-being but was also a necessary part and condition of civilization, culture and education. However, he also recognized the formative contribution made by society in providing the reciprocal foundation of a "negative" freedom (i.e., non-interference in self-regarding matters) with reference to the liberties of thought and discussion. In addition, Mill reworked the concept of atomic individualism by recognizing the government's duty to foster "positive" freedom by establish ing conditions for individual "happiness" (qua improvement) in changing social circumstances.29 Thus, in his transition from atomic to social individualism, Mill retained his concept of the individual's pre-social nature but he altered his concept of the role of government in the concerns of the individual.
Throughout his writings, Mill's idea of the highest form of government was always one which would encourage the most beneficial results. Notwithstanding the relativity model of Spirit, this fundamental principle remained constant in Mill's work. It was his particular recommendations on how to achieve beneficial results that would vary according to circumstance. Recognizing that a utility principle too narrowly conceived was actually counterproductive, Mill 28j.s. Mill, "On Liberty," The Utilitarians, pp. 532, 552. 29j.s. Mill, On Social Freedom, pp. 40-50. The Individ ualist argument for positive freedom was taken to its extreme point of departure in a work of questionable author ship, On Social Freedom. Here, society was explained as a condition for individual growth, and human beings were described as social beings requiring the society of others for the fulfilment of their self-regarding interests. Left to themselves, humans would be in continual misery and their "freedom would be practically limited to their freedom to starve." (p. 46) first endorsed representative democracy on the ground that in larger societies, all individuals cannot participate in public b u s i n e s s .30 However, in his Autobiography, he later explained in utilitarian fashion that he ceased to consider representative democracy as an absolute principle; he regarded it as a question of time, place and circum stance. 31 Mill argued further that social conditions may be altered deliberately to better promote the moral demands that "the human condition" made upon society. Mill could accept on utilitarian grounds the idea of a "higher" or moral law ultimately sanctioning social, political and economic relations. Utilitarian calculations were not bound to underscore the claims which were equally considered from the viewpoint of the natural rights of all individuals, but rather, utilitarian concepts accented the sorts of methods which individuals and societies could use to attain the greatest happiness. In principle, democratic liberalism could not encompass a greater happiness on any ideal grounds other than the equal rights of all individuals to minimally some happiness. Mill advocated a gradual change for this goal on the moral basis of utility and natural rights.
Mill's Socialist Heritage
Mill's philosophical references to socialist alternatives appeared more frequently in his later writings and with respect to questions about the most just and productive governance of society. These writings about socialism reflected the influence of history, social conditions, and biography. 
F-10 in M i l l ' s time because, as this study w i l l show, Mill s h o u l d b e r e c e i v e d m o r e as an i n t e r p r e t e r than as an i n n o v a t o r of so c i a l i s t thought. Ho w e v e r^h i s w r i t i n g s did c o n t r i b u t e to the d e v e l o p m e n t of some l a t e r soc i a l i s t ideas, notably those a s s o c i a t e d w i t h E n g l i s h F a b i a n socialists.
In M i l l ' s time s o c i a l i s m was lar g e l y a r e s p o n s e to u n h a p p y or i n t o l e r a b l e i n dustrial conditions.
It m e a n t " c h i r e r s , he a n t i c i p a t e d in one o f its facets the impor t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e b y later p o l i t i c a l theorists b e t w e e n the indu s t r i a l and p e a s a n t w o r k e r (between " t own a n d c o u n t r y " ) . 
l i s t philosophies, s o c i a l i s m a n d l i beral c a p i t a l i s m themselves cannot u l t i m a t e l y be reconciled. Bas e d o n Mill ' s c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t of i r r e c o n c i l a b l y l i b e r a l i s t themes throughout his later w r i t i n g s , " s o cialism" seems to this w r i t e r to h a v e e x t e n d e d r a t h e r than to h a v e r e
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The Fea t u r e s of S o c i a l i s m in H i l l 's P h i l o s o p h y
The G e n e r a l F eatures of Socialism. a n d libe r a l i s t s can e a s i l y o b s c u r e the b o u n d a r y lines  b e t w e e n s o c i a l i s m a n d liberal capitalism, in general.  Some s o c i alists h a v e p e r e m p t o r i l y r e c l a s s i f i e d as " l i b e r a l "  others' a v o w e d l y s o c i a l i s t views; m a n y l i b e r a l i s t s h a v e  r e f e r r e d to ra d i c a l b u t quite dispa r a t 
The P o l e m i c s that f l o u r i s h amo n g c e r t a i n socialists
e criticisms of c a p i t a l i s m u n d e r the general r u b r i c of "soc i a l i s t . " N evertheless, as the follo w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l demonstrate, some clear b o u n d a r i e s can be d r a w n b e t w e e n the two philosophies. As w e h a v e shown, Mill h i m s e l f appears to h a v e f o r m u l a t e d a c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t he r e g a r d e d as true (nonpolemical) socialism. Consequently, in o r d e r to evalttoAEe (at le a s t b y his o w n standards) the appr o p r i a t e n e s s o f M i l l ' s d e s i g n a t i o n as "true" socia l i s t and, at the same time to a v o i d the p o l e m i c a l pit f a l l s n o t e d above, some u n i v e r s a l l y -r e c o g n i z e d formal c r i t e r i a about w h a t cons t i t u t e s a s o c i a l i s m m u s t be set. For p r e s e n t purposes, the f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i a m a y be c o n s i d e r e d as d e s c r i p t i v e of 1 9 t h and 20th c e n t u r y s ocietal forms of s o c i a l i s m w h i c h h a v e b e e n acknowledged u n i v e r s a l l y . I n c l u d e d amo n g these w o u l d be the m a n y v a r i e t i e s of b o t h M a r x i a n (and democratic) socialism, and of c ommunal c o o p e r a t i v e s (e.g., Owen's v i l l a g e s of cooperation, F o u r ier's p halansteries, and P r o u d h o n ' s m u t u a l associations). Those forms e x c l u d e d f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n are the fascist Nati o n a l S o c i a l i s m (Nazism) and some e x t r e m e v a r i a t i o n s of a n a r c h i s m (e.g., Stirner's U n i o n of Egoists, Godwin's n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n s o ciety of free p e r s o n s ) . The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n of the e s sential c r i t e r i a of s o c i a l i s m s h o u l d reveal w h a t a " socialism" m u s t h a v e to d i s t i n g u i s h it f r o m other theories. C o m p e t i t i o n ,
So c i a l i s t s and n o n -s o c i a l i s t s alike in Mill ' s time c o n s i d e r e d the p r i n c i p l e of competition, as against the p r i n c i p l e of cooperation, to b e an i n d e f e a s i b l e feature of the p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s y s t e m . 45 Some a t t r i b u t e d its e x i s t e n c e s o lely to the w o r k i n g s of a s y s t e m of p r i v a t e property, w h e r e a s others, o f t e n defenders of c o m p e t i t i o n a n d s o -c a l l e d free enterprise, p l a c e d its origins in some n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n of s e l f -i nterestedness. The soc i a l i s t w r i t i n g s and ideas w i t h w h i c h M i l l was con v e r s a n t e s s e n t i a l l y 45j.s. Mill, "Newman's P o l i t i c a l Economy, P r i n c i p l e s , p. 442.
F-13 r e j e c t e d p r i v a t e pr o p e r t y ' s structural and m o t i v a t i n g c o m p etitiveness, e s p e c i a l l y for life's n e c essities, as an i m m o r a l a t a v i s m that was in con f l i c t w i t h the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of s o c i a l i s t society. P r i v a t e Property,
All s o c i alists share a p r i n c i p l e d o p p o s i t i o n to the s y s t e m of p r i v a t e property; in their w r i t i n g s they seek its e v e n t u a l abolition, and therewith, its c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s for survival resources. However, s o cialists d i s a g r e e about h o w b e s t to a c c o m p l i s h this g o a l .^6 M i l l d i s t i n g u i s h e d g e n e r a l l y two types of socialists. In the first c a t e g o r y w e r e those in p u r s u i t of a n e w social o r d e r that w o u l d b e b o t h free f r o m p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y and i ndividual c o m p e t i t i o n and be b a s e d o n a country-wide p r o l i f e r a t i o n of small au t o n o m o u s units m o d e l l e d o n that of a v i l l a g e c o m m u n i t y (e.g., the systems of Fourier, Owen, et a l . ) . 47 In the s e c o n d c a t e g o r y h e p l a c e d the commu n i s t or r e v o l u t i o n a r y socialists w h o a d v o c a t e d the m a n a g e m e n t of a country's p r o d u c t i v e resources by one central a u t h o r i t y (i.e., the n a t i o n a l government) w h o i n t e n d e d to seize for the b e n e f i t of the w o r k i n g classes all the p r o p e r t y in a country. A c c o r d i n g to Mill, c o m m u n i s t d o c t r i n e forms the e x t r e m e lim i t of s o c i a l i s m .48
Ownership. s o c i a l i s t e c o n o m y p r o d u c e the gre a t e s t share of the s t a t e ' s total output. e x p e c t e d to) p r o d u c e a m u c h s m aller p r o p o r t i o n of the  state's total production, and are u s u a l l y r e s t r 
A n o t h e r f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a s o c i a l i s t i c an d a n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c (or p r i v a t e property) s y s t e m concerns the c o n c e p t i o n e a c h has o f p r o p e r t y a n d of the type of o w n e r s h i p of the m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n g e n e r a l l y encouraged. A l t h o u g h in a g i v e n so c i e t y "mixed" econo m i e s are p o s s i b l e to some degree, this is n o t the case w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the system's b a s i c structure, for either p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p or social o w n e r s h i p p r e d o m i n a t e s . This fact allows us to k e e p clear o u r t h e oretical c o n c e p t of the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the two social systems as pure types. B o t h s o c i alists and p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y theorists d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e sectors of economy, b u t they define their r e s p e c t i v e domains in terms they 4 6 a p i t h y c o m p a r i s o n and con t r a s t of the d i f f e r i n g m e t h o d s a d v o c a t e d b y socialists m a y be fou n d in: M a r t i n Buber, Paths in U t o p i a (Boston
F-li| c o n s i d e r cl o s e s t to their p r i n c i p l e s of s o c i o e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . D i s t i n c t i v e features of the p u b l i c sector g e n e r a l l y r e f l e c t the focus of o w n e r s h i p of a society's p r o d u c t i v e means. The p u b l i c sector u n d e r s o c i a l i s m is m u c h l a r g e r than u n d e r a p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s y s t e m of production. P u b l i c -or s t a t e -o w n e d companies in a
In a p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s y s t e m they (are
i c t e d to s ervice functions such as t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and u t i l i t i e s . 49 G e n e r a l i z i n g about socialism, then, it advocates the p r e d o m i n a n t c o l l e c t i v e o w n e r s h i p o f the means of production, as r e f l e c t e d in it's concept of the p u b l i c sector.50 E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g and D i s t ribution,
The r e l a t e d no t i o n s of e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g and d i s t r i b u t i o n h a v e d i s t i n c t i v e forms in socia l i s t theories.
The idea of d i s t r i b u t i o n involves the total social resou r c e s (e.g., goods, services, labor, those of nature, etc.) ava i l a b l e for u s e in a giv e n society. l c o u l d n o t embrace some of the b a s i c p r inciples or  c o n c o m i t a n t aspects of s o c i a l i s m (as has b e e n i n d i c a t e d in  M i l l 's defense of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y m e n t i o n e d above) . 
Specifically, it m a y app l y to that amou n t e a r m a r k e d for use by the society's p r o d u c t i v e apparatus, or it m a y refer to its a l l o c a t i o n for use in the p u b l i c s e ctor as a whole. The d i s t r i b u t i v e process r e fers n o t o n l y to w h a t one m a y get b u t also to w h a t one m a y h a v e to do to get it. In either case, d i s t r i b u t i o n u n d e r s o c i a l i s m is a c c o m p l i s h e d th r o u g h c e n t r a l i z e d social p l a n n i n g c a l c u l a t e d p r e s u m a b l y in terms of "the p u b l i c good." In fact, it is this feature that socialists cont e n d gives to their s y s t e m its s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r the p r o d u c t i v e a n a r c h y that prev a i l s in pr i v a t e p r o p e r t y systems (e.g., w i t h r e s p e c t to their i n e f f i c i e n c y a n d w a s t e f u l n e s s ) , as far as s e rvice to the publ i c g o o d is concerned. A l t h o u g h s o c i a l i s m seeks to schedule all its econ o m i c a c t i v i t i e s , a d j u s t i n g t h e m to the needs of the community, a p l a n n e d e c o n o m y alone c o u l d not be c o n s i d e r e d as s o c i a l i s m but r a t h e r as one of its d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s . In contrast to s o c i a l i s t p l a n n i n g the p r e m i s e o f p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e has b e e n that c o m p e t i n g eco n o m i c units w i t h i n the priv a t e p r o p e r t y s y s t e m (as if led b y ''t h e invis i b l e h a n d^o f A d a m Smith) serve the commonwealth, b e t t e r t h a n w o u l d the units 4 9 J o h n R a w l s , A T h e o r y of J u s t i c e (Cambridge : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), p. 266. 50The i d e a of social o w n e r s h i p is d istinct f r o m that of social production. P r o d u c t i o n is social in all societies b e c a u s e it is a resu l t of co l l e c t i v e e f fort or its labor. of p r o d u c t i o n b a s e d o n co o p e r a t i v e association. A l t h o u g h it is an e x a g g e r a t i o n of so c i a l i s t i d e o l o g y that c a p i t a l i s m is t o t a l l y unplanned, it is true in the
This p o i n t requires g r e a t e r e l a b o r a t i o n in o r d e r to show h o w M i l l ' s " s o c i a l i s m " s hould be i n t e r p r e t e d as an e x t e n s i o n of his d e m o c r a t i c liberalism.
Competition, W r i t i n g u n d e r the in f l u e n c e of the St. Simonians, M ill d e c l a r e d c o m p e t i t i o n to be m o r a l l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e b o t h in c r e a t i n g a c l i m a t e o f a n t a g o n i s m and d i s trust and in m a k i n g someone's gains d e p e n d e n t u p o n someone elses losses. Mill a d v i s e d that the a d v e r saries of s o c i a l i s m w o u l d do w e l l to r e t h i n k their p o s i t i o n o n c o m p e t i t i v e individualism. On the o t h e r hand, he did concede that s o c i a l i s m for all its r i g h t f u l c r i t i c i s m of c o m p e t i t i o n h a d o n l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e p r o p o s a l s for its r e p l a c e m e n t .5 2 f53 However, as u n d e s i r a b l e as he c o n s i d e r e d the antis o c i a l effects of competition, he r e m a i n e d m u c h m o r e c o n c e r n e d a b out s u p p o s e d evils to be p r e v e n t e d b y competition. M ill's e a rly e x p l i c i t dissent f r o m w h a t he c o n s i d e r e d to be the "most c onspicuous a nd v e h e m e n t pa r t of" s o c i a l i s t teachings, " their declama t i o n s a g a i n s t c o m p e t i t i o n , "54 i s a p o s i t i o n he e s p o u s e d t h r o ughout his l a ter w r i tings. He c o n s i d e r e d it a m i s t a k e n idea to charge u p o n c o m p e t i t i o n all the evils that exist in the s y s t e m of free enterprise. D e s p i t e the i n c o n v e n i e n c e like h o s t i l i t i e s and jealo u s i e s that a t t e n d competition, he b e l i e v e d its o p e r a t i o n to o b v i a t e even g r e a t e r ones like m e n t a l dullness and idleness. He m a d e no radical d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s as a p e r s o n a l att i t u d e or as a s t ructural feature of a social system. Thus, Mill ' s v i e w of c o m p e t i t i o n can be said to r e c e i v e m u c h of its c o n s i d e r a t i o n fr o m its l i b e r t a r i a n worth
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G-2 e f f e c t u a t i n g b o t h d e s i r e d "truths" and "the g r e a t e r good". His q u a l i f i e d b u t d e t e r m i n e d support for c o m p e t i t i o n m a y also b e i n d i c a t e d as follows.
He v i e w e d the r e m u n e r a t i o n of labor p r i m a r i l y as a r e s u l t of the l a w of competition.55 h o p l a c e M i l l n e a r the p e r i m e t e r s of s o c i a l i s m  (as a c o n s i s t e n t c h a m p i o n of the w o r k i n g c l a s s e s ) . S u pport of the P r i v a t e P r o p e r t y Systems. 
Moreover, he a s s e r t e d that c o m p e t i t i o n is n e i t h e r as
I n sofar as M i l l d e f e n d e d c o m p e t i t i o n in social life, h e c o n s i s t e n t l y s u p p o r t e d the type of social s y s t e m that a l l o w e d c o m p e t i t i o n to o p e r a t e m o s t freely, to wit, the p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y system. D e s p i t e his c o n c e p t i o n of the f u ture s o c i e t y as one h a v i n g some s o c i a l i s t i c features, h e r e a d i l y e n d o r s e d the s y s t e m of p r i v a t e property. He t h ought that the v arious schemes of c o m m u n i t a r i a n p r o p e r t y s h o u l d b e e x a m i n e d b y s m a l l -s c a l e e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n b e f o r e b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d as r e p l a c e m e n t s for the e x i s t i n g system. The p r e s e n t s y s t e m of i n d i vidual p r o p e r t y shou l d not be undermined, as c a l l e d for b y socialism, b u t r a ther i m p r o v e d u p o n t h r o u g h the e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the
localized, o n w h a t b a sis m i g h t a n a t i o n a l e n t i t y be e x p e c t e d to s u s t a i n its v i t a l a ctivities and terr i t o r i a l integrity?
To a v o i d i n t e r n e c i n e r i v a l r y a n d a n a r c h y o n the n a t i o n a l level, Mi l l a d v o c a t e d in effect, o v e r a l l p o l i t i c a l p l a n n i n g to b e c a r r i e d t h r o u g h b y the a g e n c y of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government. develop his own faculties and execute his will. The mature individual alone was regarded as the best judge and executor of his own affairs. In On Liberty, we see another configuration of the contingency and noncontingency arguments as a closer alignment of utilitarianism and natural law in the democratic liberal phase. The abstract individual now gained social awareness, acknowledging that a suitable adjustment must be made between individual independence and social control.73 While Mill continued to believe in the sanctity of the individual personality and its ability to choose the good, the role of government was ultimately reconsidered in light of the individual's social needs.
M i l l ' s l i b e r a l i s t s o l u t i o n to this p r o b l e m is e x t r a p o l a t a b l e f r o m his p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n
In his later years, during the phase in which we consider his status as socialist, Mill allowed an increasing role to government in the individual's affairs. The idea itself of the individual was gradually redefined as a social individual, whose very essence could not be separated from his place in society. While freedom from tyranny remained a precondition for happiness, life in society demanded of the individual a greater sense of social duty. Accordingly, changing political circumstances compelled Mill to reconsider the duties and power of the society with respect to the individual human being. As a result, Mill came to recognize not only the ordinary functions of government but also the utility of social forces in achieving collectively agreed upon ends that individuals themselves could have neither the resources nor the power to accomplish. While Mill's attitude on paternalism per se remained as consistently harsh as throughout his earlier writings, he now regarded fewer instances of intervention as paternalistic.
For present purposes, the reader should be reminded that Mill's conjectures about the ranges of future socialist governments were built largely upon his (limited) exposure to small-scale experiments all occuring within the context of liberal capitalism. Furthermore, his support of socialism was more or less energetic according to the particular philosophical issue or biographical period under considera tion. During the time that he repudiated "that tyranny over the individual which socialist systems are supposed to involve"74> it might seem that Mill should have held socialism to embrace a wider form of paternalism and to unequivocally reject them both. However, Mill totally rejected neither 73j.s. Mill, Principles, P. 479. 74sriggs, Autobiography, p. 168.
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small distance along socialist lines,"75 We may recognize Mill's individualism to be "thoroughly consistent," but its consistency is most clearly seen from the standpoint of his continuing commitment to such basic liberalist ideals. However, his socialism became incompatible with his individualism as an intentional redefinition of his philosophical identity. Indeed, it is a serious attack on Mill to call him inconsistent in claiming to be a socialist while adhering to the principles of individualism. Mill's philosophy appears as consistent only if we ignore his self-designation and consider the whole of his writings. 
